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The Division of Professional Degrees and Licences Upon 
Marital Breakdown: A Commentary on Caratun v. Caratun 
Joan E. Hatch* 
The question of how to deal with professional degrees upon marital breakdown 
is an interesting one, yet there is a relative paucity of Canadian cases on the 
subject. In the United States, where the issue has been considered much more 
frequently, there are conflicting opinions as to the proper approach. Often, 
degrees acquired during marriage are not explicitly dealt with on their own; they 
are used as factors to be considered in awarding maintenance payments or an 
unequal division of other marital assets. 1 Rarely has it been argued that the 
value of the degrees themselves be divided as part of the matrimonial property; 
rarer still has such an argument met with much success.2 Courts have focussed 
on the question of whether degrees can be considered property and rejected the 
claim on that basis. Underlying these decisions is a concern for where a division 
of a degree as property might lead. 
This paper addresses these policy concerns and examines arguments in 
favour of dividing degrees acquired during the marriage as matrimonial 
property. Given the limitations of using existing matrimonial property 
legislation to do this, it is suggested that this is most effectively accomplished 
through a remedial constructive trust. These principles will then be applied to an 
analysis of the Ontario Court of Appeal's recent decision in Caratun v. 
Caratun. 3 
The first issue to consider is why degrees should be treated as matrimonial 
assets for division purposes. Most provinces explicitly consider a spouse's 
*Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. anticipated 1993. 
1 See, eg. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, ss. 33(9)(b), 33 (9)(j); Family 
Maintenance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.160, s.4(h); Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, 
c.275, s.13(g). 
2 See, eg. Cole v. Cole (1989), 88 N.S.R.(2d) 432 (N.S.S.C., T.D.); McGuigan v. 
McGuigan (1991), 33 R.F.L.(3d) 183 (N.S.S.C., T.D.). 
3 (1992), 42 R.F.L.(3d) 113 (Ont. C.A.); rev'g (1987), 9 R.F.L.(3d) 337 (Ont. H.C.) 
[hereinafter Caratun]. 
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contribution to a degree in awarding maintenance.4 The problem with a 
maintenance award is that it is given on the basis of need on the part of the 
rece1vmg spouse; no compensation is awarded purely as recognition for 
significant contribution. In Clarke v. Clarke,5 the Supreme Court of Canada 
examined this problem with respect to the treatment of pensions. Wilson, J. (as 
she then was) adopted the reasoning of Cameron, J.A. in Tataryn v. Tataryn:6 
A matrimonial property right is not to be confused with a right 
to alimony or maintenance. The two differ fundamentally. 
Not only do they depend for their existence on different 
enactments and spring from different assumptions, their legal 
character is wholly dissimilar; the first is proprietary in 
nature, and concerns capital and its division: the other is 
personal and involves income and the support of one spouse 
by the other. 
The statutory right of a married woman to share in the 
property accumulated during her marriage is rooted in the 
modern view of marriage as a partnership, and derives from 
the presumption of the Matrimonial Property Act that each of 
the partners contributed equally and independently to the 
acquisition of the marital property. Neither the conduct or 
condition, nor the needs or means, of either of the partners to 
the marriage have anything to do with the earned right of each 
of them to share in the property of the marriage. 7 
This analysis raises the possibility of whether degrees would qualify as 
property under provincial matrimonial property legislation. As stated earlier, 
arguments in support of this approach have rarely been successful. For instance, 
it has often been held that a degree cannot be considered "property" because it 
is intangible and non-transferrable. The right to receive a pension, however, is 
also intangible and non-transferrable yet it has been found to fall within the 
ambit of matrimonial property legislation. 8 It is important to remember that one 
of the policies behind matrimonial property legislation is the recognition of 
marriage as a partnership and the consequent equal sharing of wealth 
accumulated during the relationship. 
Courts, including the Ontario Court of Appeal in Caratun,9 have also had 
4 Supra note 1. 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 795 [hereinafter Clarke]. 
6 (1984), 38 R.F.L.(2d) 272 (Sask. C.A.). 
Ibid. at 285-286; cited in Clarke, supra note 5 at 810. 
8 Clarke v. Clarke, supra note 5. 
9 Supra note 3. 
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trouble with the valuation of a degree. Admittedly, the value of degrees is 
difficult to determine. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, stated in 
relation to pensions: 
Without in any way minimizing the difficulties that may arise 
when courts are faced with the valuation problem, it is my 
view that such difficulty is not a bar to concluding that 
pensions are property for the purposes of equal division. 
Courts are frequently required to put a value on items that 
have no readily ascertainable value such as pain and suffering 
or the goodwill of a business .... The task is not an impossible 
one and the difficulty of placing a current value on pension 
rights is not, in my view, a good enough reason for refusing to 
characterize pensions as matrimonial property. 10 
The courts have raised other concerns in denying a division of degrees 
under matrimonial property legislation. These deal mainly with the effect the 
inflexibility of a property award would have on the degreed spouse's ability to 
change occupations or even survive economic hard times. Unlike a support 
award, matrimonial property divisions cannot later be revisited. This problem is, 
however, more a failing of the legislative regime than of the ·concept of a 
proprietary award per se. 
It is submitted that the use of equitable principles of unjust enrichment and 
constructive trust will alleviate many of the above noted concerns yet still retain 
the benefits of proprietary compensation for contributions to a degree. A further 
benefit is that use of unjust enrichment and constructive trust shifts the analysis 
properly away from focussing on whether the degree is or is not "property." 
Ultimately, this is not the issue that needs to be decided. The real focus of the 
analysis should be on whether a proprietary as opposed to a personal remedy is 
justified in the circumstances. The constructive trust approach does exactly that. 
It is now well established in Canada that a trust action can proceed 
independently of provincial matrimonial property legislation. II In Sorochan v. 
Sorochan, 12 the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated a clear two-step analysis 
to the equitable approach. First, a claim in unjust enrichment must be 
established, according to the criteria set.out in Pettkus v. Becker: 13 (a) an 
lO Clarke, supra note 5 at 826. For a discussion of different valuation methods, see C. 
Welsh, "Apportioning Degrees Earned During Marriage: An Equitable Justification" 
(1987) 45 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 272 at 288-292; L. Mullenix, "The Valuation of an 
Education Degree at Divorce" (1983) 16 Loyola L.A.L. Rev. 227. 
11 Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70; 23 R.F.L.(3d) 337 at 361 [hereinafter Rawluk; 
cited to R.F.L.(3d)]. 
12 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38 [hereinafter Sorochan]. 
13 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834. 
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enrichment of one spouse; (b) a corresponding deprivation of the other; and (c) 
an absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment. Once this has occurred, the 
court then considers what the appropriate remedy would be. A constructive trust 
will be awarded only if the circumstances warrant the granting of a proprietary 
remedy. Factors to consider in making this decision are the causal connection of 
the contributions connected to the property, the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, and the longevity of the relationship. 14 
In the abstract, a spouse's contribution towards the degree of the other 
would seem capable of meeting the criteria for unjust enrichment. Similarly, 
there is certainly a case to be made for a proprietary remedy of constructive 
trust. The important point to remember is that a finding of unjust enrichment 
and award of constructive trust is discretionary. This leads to much more 
flexibility than is available under a legislative regime. With matrimonial 
property statutes, family property is divided equally as of right. With equitable 
principles, the claiming party must prove entitlement. This will safeguard 
against spurious claims that courts, such as the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Caratun, were concerned would arise. For example, where a pre-marital 
contract stipulates that one spouse will contribute to the education of the other, 
an unjust enrichment claim will be unsuccessful. Similarly, an established 
businessman who supports his wife in getting a degree that she is pursuing for 
personal development only will not receive a proprietary award because there is 
no reasonable expectation by both parties that the degree is for the mutual 
benefit of the family. 
Where the Sorochan guidelines may break down is in the area of longevity 
of marriage. There is less of a case to be made for imposing a constructive trust 
on a degree in marriages that have continued long after the degree's acquisition. 
In these cases, there has been sufficient time for the family to reap the benefits 
of the improved standard of living that the degree promised to provide. The 
contributing spouse has already been at least partially compensated by enjoying 
that standard of living during the marriage. Further compensation can be 
effected by a regular division of assets, acquired as a result of the increase in 
wealth leading from the degree, or, in some cases, a maintenance payment. The 
approach outlined in this paper, however, more readily applies to marriages that 
dissolve soon after the degree has been acquired, that is, before its benefits have 
accrued: there has been no sharing of an improved standard of living and what's 
more, at this stage in their lives, the degree is often the most valuable asset the 
couple has. 
The facts of the Caratun case can be briefly stated. The couple was married 
14 Sorochan, supra note 12 at 47-53. 
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in Romania in 1976 after trying to acquire the required state permission for at 
least three years. The trial judge found as a fact that Mr. Caratun' s marriage and 
subsequent fathering of children was for the purpose of emigrating to North 
America to practise dentistry. 15 From the time they arrived in Toronto in 1978 
until Mr. Caratun finally received his licence to practice in 1981, both parties 
worked very hard, taking multiple jobs to make ends meet. Two days after Mr. 
Caratun was notified that he had passed his final exam and was qualified to 
practise dentistry, he told his wife that he wanted a divorce. 
The trial judge found that a degree or licence was property under the Family 
Law Act16 and could be valued and divided under that legislation. She also 
indicated that a constructive trust could be used to divide the property as well. 
The Court of Appeal of Ontario did not follow Van Camp, J.'s reasoning 
although the quantum of her award was unchanged. The court rejected the 
contention that a licence or degree could be considered property under the 
Family Law Act. It did not believe that a dental licence was a form of property 
that was recognized by the common law and therefore within the statutory 
definition. 17 )'he court dismissed the constructive trust argument on the grounds 
that such a remedy could only be given where there is a traditional property right 
at stake. McKinlay, J.A. stated: 
I agree that if the licence constituted "property" then there is 
no reason why, in a proper case, that property could not be 
subject to a constructive trust. However, if the licence does 
not constitute property, then there is nothing to which the 
constructive trust could attach. 18 
That there is unjust enrichment in the Caratun case is quite clear on the 
facts. In assessing the appropriate remedy in this case, a personal remedy such 
as damages would be inadequate. The couple had worked together for many 
years to achieve this goal of being able to practise in Canada and attaining a 
better standard of living than that available to them in Romania. Before any 
benefits from obtaining this goal could begin to accrue, the marriage dissolved. 
The non-owning spouse must be given a proprietary remedy to obtain an interest 
in the asset's growth. In Rawluk, Cory, J. recognized the special benefits 
consequent with a proprietary award: 
Ownership encompasses far more than a mere share in the 
value of property. It includes additional legal rights, elements 
15 (Ont. H.C.), supra note 3 at 343. 
16 Supra note I. 
11 Family law Act, ibid. at s.4. 
18 Caratun (Ont. C.A.), supra note 3 at 125. 
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of control and increased legal responsibilities. In addition, it 
may well provide psychological benefits derived from pride of 
ownership. 19 
With respect to the Court of Appeal's contention that a constructive trust 
can only be imposed on a traditional form of property, it is respectfully 
submitted that it does not accord with the development of the remedial 
constructive trust. As Laforest, J. stated in a case considering constructive 
trusts in a commercial context: 
[I]t is not the case that a constructive trust should be reserved 
for situations where a right of property is recognized. That 
would limit the constructive trust to its institutional function, 
and deny to it the status of a remedy, its more important role. 
Thus, it is not in all cases that a pre-existing right of property 
will exist when a constructive trust is ordered. The imposition 
of a constructive trust can both recognize and create a right of 
property . 
.. .It is not the recognition of a right of property that leads to a 
constructive trust. It is not necessary, therefore, to determine 
whether confidential information is property. 20 
Clearly, "professional degrees and licences" can be substituted for "confidential 
information" in the last sentence of the passage quoted. 
In conclusion, there is a strong case to be made for considering professional 
degrees and licences as part of the accumulated wealth during marriage that is 
divisible upon breakdown. The use of unjust enrichment and constructive trust 
correctly focusses the analysis on whether any given case justifies a proprietary 
award; therefore, it is more flexible and sensitive to individual circumstances 
than matrimonial property legislation. In dismissing Mrs. Caratun's claim for an 
interest in her husband's dental practice, the Ontario Court of Appeal did not 
thoroughly analyze the constructive trust issue. Perhaps the Supreme Court of 
Canada will have occasion to do so. 21 
19 Supra note 11 at 365. 
20 LAC Minerals ltd. v. International Corona Resources ltd., (1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 at 
676-677. 
21 Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court of Canada filed 25 November 1992, Bulletin of 
Proceedings Taken in the Supreme Court of Canada, (27 November 1992) at 2622; 
application submitted to Court 29 January 1993, Bulletin of Proceedings Taken in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, (12 February 1993) at 267. 
